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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: James M. Walters 
Title: The Pilot Proficiency Audit of Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities: Adding to 
the Air Carrier Safety Toolbox 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Aeronautical Science 
Year: 2002 
The correlation between air carrier pilot performance and age, total flight time, total 
airline flight time, and time in current position has not been fully documented. This study 
observed 62 F/Os in line operations and graded 74 knowledge, skills, and abilities 
performance variables, utilizing a five-point Likert scale. Knowledge items scored 
slightly below the referent, with no improvement over time; skills improved with both 
flight time and years of service; and abilities declined markedly across all independent 
variables. Changes to pilot training syllabi and techniques, as well as hiring practices, 
may be indicated. Integrating Pilot Proficiency Audit data into existing LOS A, AQP, 
ASAP, and FOQA programs can provide a more robust air carrier safety program. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The history of commercial aviation in the United States (U. S.), the safest and 
most efficient air transportation system in the world, is a testament to continuous change. 
From propellers to jets, from simple radio navigation to Global Positioning Systems 
(GPS), and from "see and avoid" to the Enhanced Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS) II, virtually every aspect of the industry has been host to remarkable 
technological development. These improvements have played a major role in the decline 
of the air carrier accident rate, from about 30 hull loss accidents per million departures in 
the early 1960s to about 2 per million in 2000. However, as pointed out by the Federal 
Aviation Administration's (FAA's) Safer Skies Initiative, at the current rate the 
worldwide aviation community can expect one major hull loss accident every week by 
2010 (Boeing, 2002)! 
Safety initiatives are ongoing in many areas, including controlled flight into 
terrain (CFIT), runway incursions, loss of aircraft control, weather detection and 
avoidance, and pilot decision making. These efforts are a real step forward in the 
industry's stated goal of reducing the fatal accident rate by 80% in the next 5 years. From 
a larger perspective, however, aviation safety is only achieved by building many layers of 
overlapping defenses; only by accurately predicting the circumstances that can lead to 
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accidents and incidents can we hope to build effective barriers or defenses into the 
aviation system. Because these barriers must depend on personnel and equipment 
functioning in a reliable and predictable manner, quality management systems have 
become increasingly important. 
In the early years of aviation safety, the mantra seemed to be 'fly it, crash it, 
redesign it, fly it, crash it. . .' resulting in only modest improvements over time. System 
safety principles, as commonly practiced by most major air carriers now, require that 
mechanisms be in place to: 
1. Identify and manage safety risks where they are predicted to be the greatest. 
2. Build and maintain appropriate layers of defense (barriers to risk). 
3. Measure the barrier's ongoing effectiveness. 
4. Evaluate system risks for prevention of accidents and mitigation of 
consequences (Mein, 2002). 
This process approach to aviation safety is reflected in other quality management 
standards, specifically the International Organization for Standardization's (ISO's) 
9000:2000. These standards describe the processes used by an organization to 
demonstrate its ability to consistently and reliably provide a product (in this case, safety) 
that meets customer and applicable regulatory requirements, and provides a basis for 
continual improvement and business excellence. Several airlines are actively seeking ISO 
9000 certification for their flight safety departments. 
The FAA has embraced the use of quality management principles in aviation 
safety by instituting the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS). This new 
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approach to airline certification and surveillance oversight was implemented in 1998. 
Unlike earlier traditional oversight methods: 
ATOS incorporates the structured application of new inspection tasks, 
analytical processes, and data collection techniques to the oversight of 
individual air carriers. This approach enables Flight Standards inspectors 
to be more effective in the oversight of air carriers by focusing on the most 
critical safety aspects of an air carrier's operation. As currently applied, 
ATOS provides a systematic process for conducting surveillance, 
identifying and dealing with risks, and providing data and analysis to 
guide the oversight of each carrier. (FAA, 2002, Overview, f 1) 
ATOS was developed from the ISO 9000:2000 guidelines, and the two quality 
mechanisms share many philosophical and "process" attributes. Most important among 
those, however, is the fundamental requirement for data-based measurement of the 
airline's safety product (pilot proficiency, training, flight operations, etc.), enhancements 
to operational systems, and effectiveness of those improvements. Unlike the more 
traditional methods of subjective safety analysis, accurate and reliable data is the 
hallmark of a modern air carrier's overall safety program. 
An Air Carrier's Data-based Safety Programs 
There are four commonly used processes for gathering operational performance 
data. The Line Oriented Safety Audit is an observational study, the Aviation Safety 
Action Program relies on voluntary participant reports, Flight Operations Quality 
Assurance monitors aircraft performance, and the Advanced Qualification Program 
maintains pilot proficiency through advanced training concepts. These programs all 
collect useful data; currently it is up to the air carrier to determine how that information is 
analyzed, and what other data should be gathered to best enhance operational safety. 
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Line Oriented Safety Audit (LOSA) 
The Line Oriented Safety Audit (LOSA) is a relatively new safety initiative that 
uses expert observers to collect data regarding air carrier flight crew performance on 
normal, scheduled flights. All observations are conducted under strict, non-jeopardy 
conditions, assuring complete anonymity to the crew. Typically observers are selected 
from all organizations involved in the audit process, including the LOSA provider, airline 
management, and the pilots union. Originally begun as an FAA research project in 1996, 
LOSA was further developed at the University of Texas at Austin and has become the 
central focus of the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO's) current flight 
safety and human factors program (Maurino, 2002). 
Information collected includes those risks and errors external to the flight deck, 
crew errors, and crew actions to mitigate and manage both risk and error. Five specific 
types of error are defined in the LOSA: (a) procedural, (b) communication, (c) 
proficiency, (d) decision making and (e) intentional non-compliance, or violations of 
regulations (Helmrich, in press). The newest generation of LOSA has incorporated the 
latest conceptual models of threat and error management. "This change greatly enhanced 
the usefulness of LOSA for airlines, expanding it from a crew resource management 
(CRM) audit to one which places skills into perspective as operational threat and error 
countermeasures" (Helmrich, 2002, p. 7). 
As outlined by James Klinect (2002), a successful LOSA study will always have 
the following 10 characteristics: 
1. Observations are made during normal flight operations. 
2. Crews volunteer to participate. 
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3. Data collection is anonymous, confidential and safety-minded. 
4. The study has joint (management & union) sponsorship. 
5. The observation instrument has appropriate targets - flight crew performance 
in normal operations. 
6. The study employs trusted and trained observers. 
7. The study has a trusted data collection site. 
8. Data are scrutinized before data analysis, to find inaccuracies and consistency. 
9. Data are used to identify areas that need enhancements. 
10. The results are given to the pilots, (p.8) 
Many LOSAs have been completed at various airlines, producing quantitative 
views of both external threats and flight crew errors in normal flight operations. 
Summarizing the results at three different airlines: 
1. External threats and crew errors were pervasive, but differ in their type and 
frequencies across airlines. 
2. The descent/approach/landing phase of flight contained the most threats, 
errors and consequential outcomes. 
3. Intentional errors were the most frequent type, but had the least consequence. 
4. Proficiency and operational decision errors were the most difficult for the 
crews to manage. 
5. Automation and checklist usage produced the most common errors, many of 
which went undetected. 
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6. CRM behavior is effective in error management. Positive traits include strong 
leadership, vigilance, and communication skills, as well as effective 
contingency planning (Klinect, Wilhelm, & Helmrich, 1999, p.687). 
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) 
In 1976 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) introduced 
the first voluntary self-disclosure program for the reporting of aviation operational errors. 
That program, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), continues to provide 
valuable data. However, confidentiality and jurisdictional requirements severely limit its 
ability to correct identifiable aviation hazards. 
Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAPs) are proactive safety initiatives. They 
are; (a) airline specific, (b) voluntary, (c) self-reporting, and (d) non-punitive. Any 
employee covered by the airline's plan (usually pilots and dispatchers) can submit an 
event report that is either a possible Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) violation, or a 
general or specific flight concern. Strict confidentiality is maintained within the program, 
and with certain limitations, the event reporters are protected from regulatory or 
certificate action. 
An Event Review Team (ERT) composed of airline, labor union, and FAA 
personnel collaborate on the details of the event, and must reach unanimous consensus on 
whatever corrective actions to be taken. That action can be either an administrative FAA 
letter (warning, correction, or no action taken), a response from the ERT directly, or a 
return of the report to the flight operations department (no FAR violation potential). 
Recent analysis shows that the ERTs are very effective in reaching that consensus 
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through a hierarchy of shared values, a working buffer to exclude 
distractions, and sideband communications that build trust. ASAP appears 
to be a highly effective cultural mechanism for identifying novel and 
subtle hazards, and designing rapid, mutually acceptable corrective 
actions. (Ganter, Dean & Cloer, 2000, p. iii) 
These programs are proving to be very successful; there are currently 20 airlines with 
active ASAP programs (Longridge, 2002). 
Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) 
Aircraft flight recorders were first introduced in the 1950s as an aid to the aircraft 
accident investigator. Mandated by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (later the FAA) 
in 1958, these devices are physically mounted in the tail of commercial aircraft, and are 
designed to capture and store virtually all of an airplane's normal flight parameters. 
Initially, these recorders were simple, scribe and foil recording mechanisms which used a 
hard, pointed stylus to physically imprint markings onto a rotating drum of metallic foil. 
It proved to be an effective design, but rather complex, and subject to mechanical failure 
and very limited in storage capacity. The latest designs (digital, solid state recorders) can 
easily track and store hundreds of in-flight aircraft parameters, over a much greater 
sampling time period. 
Most parameters are captured every second, but many, especially engine 
indications (temperatures, pressures, etc.), can be sampled at much greater rates if 
necessary. This is particularly helpful for maintenance quality assurance. Flight 
parameter information is still used in the investigative capacity, but the newest recording 
systems have been supplemented with additional hardware, the Quick Access Recorder 
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(QAR), which provides immediate and constant availability, and thus monitoring, of the 
aircraft data. 
An airline's Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) program is responsible 
for reviewing all this data on a routine basis, gathering valuable information on crew 
actions and aircraft operations. This provides "a valid, empirical record of crew inputs to 
controls, aircraft navigation and engine parameters . . . contributing to safety by 
identifying error inducing environmental conditions at certain airports and trends in crew 
behaviour over time" (Helmrich, 2002, p. 6). The information can be used to improve 
effectiveness of operational procedures, maintenance and engineering procedures, other 
safety programs, and pilot training. The concept is controversial - but as Norman 
Mineta, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, recently stated, "Aviation safety must be taken 
to a new level, a level that won't be achieved by doing things the way they have been 
done in the past" (Mineta, 2002). 
The key to FOQA acceptance with pilots is that the data is collected within strict 
non-jeopardy guidelines, providing immunity even if evidence of a procedural violation 
is found. Because the data is protected from public disclosure by FAA order (49 U.S.C. 
40123), air carriers voluntarily share this and other safety information with the FAA. 
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) 
The introduction of the Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) by the FAA in 
1991 fundamentally changed the traditional concepts of flight crew training. The new, 
alternative methods of qualifying and certifying pilots under Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) Parts 121 and 135 are strictly proficiency-based, and are airline specific. An air 
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carrier7 s participation is voluntary, but the benefits realized from implementation of AQP 
include: training tailored to the carrier's operation, cost reductions due to more efficient 
scheduling of training, and enhanced flight crew proficiency (Kaempf & Klinger, 1993). 
As flexible as the program may be, however, there are a few mandated FAA 
requirements: 
1. The program must be airplane specific to each make, model, or series of aircraft, 
and include basic indoctrination, qualification, and continuing qualification 
curriculums for every duty position. 
2. The training should be conducted with a full crew complement (Captain and 
First Officer), and must include a Line Operational Evaluation (LOE). The LOE 
consists of a simulator-based, real-time flight scenario designed to address 
specific flight operations and CRM skills. 
3. Instructor/evaluators must be trained in specific strategies to assure reliable pilot 
performance and standardization verification. They must also collect proficiency 
data on students, for internal evaluation of curriculum development and to supply 
to the FAA (Longridge, 1997). Data that is collected is routinely stored in two 
databases: a Program Audit Database (PADB) and a Pilot Performance Database 
(PPDB). The PPDB contains all pilot initial qualification, LOE, Initial Operating 
Experience (IOE), and continuing qualification results (Holt, 1997). 
Pilot performance as assessed by the AQP is done in a full flight simulator. The 
various checks consist of Maneuver Validation and Line Oriented Flight Training 
(LOFT). Maneuver Validation, or "first look," consists of a series of specific, pre-
determined, maneuvers (engine failure at Vi, stalls, etc.). The LOFT employs a series of 
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"event sets" which make up a complete flight scenario, to be flown in real time by a 
complete flight crew. The emphasis is on CRM, decision making, and teamwork. The 
importance of CRM in the overall context of AQP is evident in recent efforts to "remove 
the separation between CRM and technical training [flight skills] to encourage crews to 
treat utilization of good CRM skills as little different from employing effective technical 
skills" (Mangold & Neumeister, 1995, p. 556). 
The collection of valid, reliable data is critical to the success of this, or any other 
proficiency-based program. A complete discussion of the principles of accurate AQP data 
collection can be found in later in this report. 
Comparative Analysis of Programs 
These four primary data-gathering safety programs provide air carriers 
operational information essential for monitoring and improving safety. Each has 
advantages over the other, and each one has certain limitations inherent to the program. 
Table 1 is a matrix that illustrates the individual air carrier safety programs and the pilot 
proficiency information that each was designed to measure. 
Pilot performance can be classified into three basic areas: Knowledge, skills, and 
abilities. For purposes of this thesis, the following definitions are assumed: 
1. Knowledge - those facts, policies, and procedures that are taught to a student 
pilot by the airline, and for which the pilot has the responsibility to remember. 
Examples would be company policies as contained in the Administrative 
Manual and aircraft operating limitations as contained in the Flight Handbook. 
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2. Skills - those flying skills that are taught to the student pilot by the airline 
during initial training, including all techniques applicable to a particular type 
Table 1 
Types of Data Generated by an Air Carrier's Safety Programs 
Attribute 
Knowledge 
Skills 
Abilities 
Personnel 
Crew 
Individual 
Crew 
Individual 
Crew 
Individual 
Scenario 
Rehearsed 
Line ops 
Rehearsed 
Line ops 
Rehearsed 
Line ops 
Rehearsed 
Line ops 
Rehearsed 
Line ops 
Rehearsed 
Line ops 
FOQA 
• 
• 
ASAP 
D 
• 
• 
• 
LOSA 
• 
D 
• 
• 
• 
• 
AQP 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
PPA 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• Denotes primary area of observation • Denotes secondary area of observation 
of aircraft to be flown at the airline. Not included would be normal "stick and 
rudder" skills that the pilot would have brought with him to the job. Examples 
would be a crosswind landing or engine start in the aircraft normally flown. 
3. Abilities - those attributes that are individual, that are not taught by the 
airline, and are reflected in all aspects of a pilot's professional career. 
Examples include workload management, decision making, attitude and 
personal appearance. 
All three categories can be observed as either crew-based or individual attributes. Both 
knowledge and skill can be further refined into those events that are rehearsed and those 
that are observed during normal line operations. Abilities, as individual traits, are always 
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present, and are assumed to be constant in any situation. The focus of any observational 
program can be to detect negative performance, i.e. errors (FOQA and ASAP), or to 
detect positive performance (LOSA). Two (AQP and the Pilot Proficiency Audit, or PPA) 
can do both. 
FOQA embodies the simplest concepts of any of the safety programs. Aircraft 
performance data is collected, and the flight skills of an individual (person flying) or to a 
lesser extent the flight crew (decision making) can be documented. Because there is no 
observer "intrusion" into the flight deck, it provides a very reliable, although limited, 
view of a pilot's flight skills during normal airline operations. In a sense, the "what" 
happened is evident, but not the "why" it happened. 
ASAP provides some of the same information, but can be distorted due to the 
reporting mechanism. Information regarding piloting skills and knowledge (individual 
and crew-based) may be discernable. But since all of the data is self-reported, the validity 
and reliability of the reporting may be suspect. Its strengths lie in the volume of data 
generated, trending of improvements initiated, and overall awareness of safety issues; not 
the monitoring of pilot knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
LOSA is an observational process, and provides excellent information regarding 
flight crew performance in a normal line operational environment. Crew-based 
knowledge, skills, and abilities can be reliably documented. An individual's knowledge 
and skill level can also be observed, but the purpose of the audit is almost exclusively to 
assess the CRM, decision-making, and threat and error management of a line flight crew. 
AQP is exclusively a training program, and is not intended to capture any 
performance metrics during normal line operations. The flight maneuvers that are 
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assessed during AQP are performed in a simulator, and are known and practiced for 
beforehand. The LOFT sessions, while similar to real world conditions, are simulated, 
and trainees are aware of scenario details prior to the training session. AQP, then, 
provides an excellent look at the performance of a flight crew (both knowledge and skill) 
in a rehearsed, simulated environment. Through "first look" maneuvers, it can also detect 
individual flying skills, and to a lesser extent, individual knowledge. 
A complete air-carrier safety program must provide reliable data in all pilot 
performance categories; knowledge, skills, and abilities. Referring to Table 1, it becomes 
evident that there are some areas that are not documented utilizing only these four 
programs. Information regarding individual flying skills in a line environment should be 
supplemented by observation of positive events. Awareness of an individual pilot's 
knowledge in the line environment is almost completely lacking, and there is no method 
by which an airline can routinely and reliably assess an individual's abilities. 
The industry, however, is aware of this shortfall. As stated in a recent data basing 
study, "In addition to the required AQP databases, possible carrier databases that would 
give relevant information include . . . a database focused on pilot Knowledge, Skills, and 
Abilities (KSA)." Furthermore, "the pilot KSA database could include demographic data 
such as pilot experience, (total hours, hours in type), individual skill/ability assessments, 
and other measures such as [pilot's] attitudes" (Holt, 1997, p. 58). 
The Pilot Proficiency Audit (PPA) 
To observe and document those categories of pilot performance that are not 
currently assessed, an airline-wide PPA could be performed. The PPA, in some ways 
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similar to a LOSA audit, would utilize trained pilot observers to monitor line operations 
in a confidential, non-jeopardy environment. Emphasis would be on individual (not crew) 
performance, and would include pilot interviews as well as observations. Consistency of 
grading would be enhanced by utilizing a standard instrument, a simple Likert scale, 
advanced training, and a limited number of observers. The recording instrument should 
be easy to use, clear in its intent, and familiar to the observers. 
Certain demographics of the subject population are a matter of record. Date of 
hire, age, total flight time, total flight time with the air carrier, and time in current aircraft 
are known for all air carrier pilots. This data could be correlated with specific scores to 
determine pilot performance trends. The results could be used to improve both ground 
and flight training techniques and syllabi; to support new training or monitoring efforts; 
and could be valuable in the new-hire pilot selection process. 
Statement of the Problem 
The correlation between pilot performance and selected personal and professional 
factors has not been fully documented. Data generated as a result of a properly designed 
pilot proficiency study could prove very valuable as yet another component in the overall 
data-collection processes of an air carrier's safety program. 
Research Questions 
The research questions that were addressed were: "Within an air carrier's pilot 
population, (a) are their KSAs directly related to the pilot's age, company longevity, total 
flight time, or time in current position?" and (b) "Could an individual pilot's KSA data be 
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integrated effectively into the air carrier's overall data collection processes to enhance 
flight safety?" 
Delimitations 
This PPA was conducted at an air carrier that operated four different types of 
large, transport category jet aircraft, with a seniority list of approximately 2,500 pilots. 
All observations were of two-pilot crews operating in controlled airspace under CFR Part 
121 regulations, and focused specifically on the performance of the air carrier's First 
Officers (F/Os). The application of the study methodology, conclusions, and/or 
recommendations to any other aviation operator or air carrier may or may not be 
appropriate, due to the extensive variations of airline size, aircraft types, operating 
philosophies, and cultures. 
CHAPTER fl 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH 
Summary of Relevant Data 
One could assume that since on-the-job performance of all pilots, whether civil, 
airline, or military, is constantly and repeatedly measured, that applicable and timely 
reference material concerning those measurements would be readily accessible. 
Unfortunately, that is not the case. Virtually all recent pilot performance studies have 
focused on the human performance (human factors) issues of workload, situational 
awareness (SA), and vigilance, all of which are all vitally important characteristics of a 
successful, professional airline pilot. The Pilot Proficiency Audit (PPA) acknowledges 
their significance through the measurement of CRM, SA, workload management, 
decision making, and cockpit discipline. 
Of greater importance to this review, however, are the physical manipulation of 
aircraft controls in a line environment, the knowledge of policies and procedures as 
taught by the air carrier, and the individual personality traits of each observed pilot. It is 
in these areas that data is scarce. As stated in a 1997 report, "There is little research in the 
commercial aviation domain examining the pilot's overall flight performance in 
assessment events like the LOE, maneuver validation and line checks" (Boehm-Davis, 
Holt, & Hansberger, 1997, p. 462). Even in those areas that are usually grouped under the 
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CRM banner, "The research base for the use of these behaviours is.. .quite thin" 
(Beaumont, 1999, p. 1197). 
There are studies in other areas that have proven valuable for purposes of this 
research. They can be grouped into the following general categories: 
1. Background studies in other areas related to pilot performance, and human 
performance in general. 
2. The design of proven observational and training exercises, including use of 
appropriate rating scales, rater-reliability, and other methods and techniques. 
3. Surveys that have identified those pilot traits, or KSAs, proven necessary for 
success in the industry. 
4. Studies that focus on the effects of age and experience on pilot performance, 
including analysis of those pilot characteristics commonly identified with 
"pilot-error" accidents. 
5. Pilot assessment studies carried out by the air carrier in the past. This PPA 
measures the performance of a select group of professional individuals, those 
employed by one particular air carrier. As such, the only reference material 
corresponding exactly to that population are previous performance 
assessments done by that air carrier. Those studies are not available to the 
public, and as such will not be referenced specifically in this literature review, 
but certain aspects of those programs have been researched to assure a more 
complete understanding of performance-rating processes previously 
undertaken by this air carrier. 
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Background Studies 
The Human Performance Measures Handbook (Gawron, 2000) was originally 
developed to assist researchers in the selection of appropriate measures in the evaluation 
of the interaction between humans and machines. Again, the focus is on traditional 
human factors, but there are several important investigative aspects relevant to a PPA. 
Those issues outlined in the Handbook that are directly applicable to an experimental 
study of pilot performance include: 
1. Precise definition of the question, description of the independent and 
dependent variables, and all experimental conditions. 
2. Documentation of "qualifiers", or variables that qualify or restrict the 
generalizability of the results. 
3. Matching of subjects with real-world, end users. 
4. Selection of proper performance measures, which must be relevant, reliable, 
valid, quantitative, and comprehensive. 
5. Use of a statistically appropriate sample size. 
6. Selection of proper data collection and data recording equipment and 
processes. 
Measurement Characteristics. 
Of particular importance is step number 4. The pilot performance measures observed 
and recorded in a PPA should be: 
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1. Relevant - The KSAs that are the focus of the audit must be the ones that need 
to be measured, and those that will provide the greatest potential benefit for 
improvements in safety. 
2. Reliable - A reliable measurement is one that is repeatable. 
If one measures the same behavior in exactly the same way under 
identical circumstances, the same value of the metric should result. 
In human performance measurement, however, individual 
differences among human operators, decision-makers, and 
maintainers occur; even the same person may respond to 
successive trials differently. (Rehmann, 1995, p. 4) 
In the case of observational studies, the observers are the key to reliability, 
and for pilot performance audits, inter-rater reliability is essential (this issue is 
discussed in detail later in this chapter). 
3. Valid - Validity refers to measuring what the study really intends to measure, 
and being appropriate to use for the intended purpose. There are five types of 
validity usually associated with human performance: face, concurrent, 
content, construct, and predictive. For purposes of this PPA, the two most 
important are: (a) face validity - subject matter experts (SMEs) determine that 
a particular measurement represents the particular pilot performance important 
to accomplish the task, and (b) predictive validity - the measures being 
observed in the study should be representative and predictive of the pilot's 
performance in the real world. Validity in general is closely tied to reliability 
(Rehmann, 1995). 
4. Quantitative measurements - A quantitative measurement provides an 
estimate of the size of the difference between experimental conditions, or in 
the case of a PPA, performance observations. Various rating scales can be 
employed, including nominal (identifies differences, with no notion of order, 
magnitude or size), ordinal (in order, but differences in position not 
comparable), interval (equal distances between values), or ratio (possesses a 
true zero) (Morrow, Jackson, Disch, & Mood, 1995). 
5. Comprehensive - A study that is comprehensive measures all aspects of a 
pilot's performance. Observing and recording all possible measurements will 
be easier and more efficient than repeating the study at a later date to gather 
data that was initially overlooked. Measurements must also gather sufficient 
detail to permit a meaningful analysis. 
6. Use of a large enough sample size to assure statistically accurate conclusions. 
7. Sensitivity - the degree to which a measure will react to changes in the 
independent variable. The measure itself can be valid and reliable, but may 
not show a large enough effect to be easily measured. 
8. Intrusiveness - almost all measures are intrusive to some degree, but the 
degree to which they alter the task performance will vary. In the case of a 
PPA, the observer, by the very nature of his/her presence on the flight deck, 
will create some distraction for the subject. Obviously, for any observational 
study, less intrusive methods are preferred (Rehmann, 1995). 
Observational and Training Studies 
Historically, objective pilot performance measurement has involved the analysis 
of deviations from pre-set flight parameter standards (altitude, heading, etc.). These 
traditional measures usually take the form of subjective, "expert" ratings made by the 
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flight instructor in a very controlled environment (Mclntyre, 1993). More recent 
developments in pilot training and checking, however, have created new pilot 
performance measurement opportunities. 
The Advanced Qualification Program relies on the observations of qualified check 
airman in both the LOE and the LOFT in the simulator. While the F/O PPA focuses on 
operational factors, not training issues, there are a number of related areas that are 
important to the overall study of pilot performance. 
Inter-rater Reliability. 
As a proficiency-based program, AQP relies on the collection of empirical data to 
assess and monitor flight crew performance. As such, the collection and analysis of 
quality data is fundamental to the program's success (Holt, Johnson, & Goldsmith, 1997). 
Ratings of pilot performance based on observed behavior can only be valid if they 
are reliable; that is, there is consistency in the measurement process. Within the AQP, 
this consistency is referred to as "inter-rater reliability" and is primarily focused on rater 
agreement and observation accuracy. Both can be affected by individual evaluator bias, 
by the measurement tool utilized, by the types of event sets and scenarios employed, and 
other factors (Baker & Dismukes, 1997). Birnbach and Longridge (1993) noted that 
because the variance associated with an unreliable measure can not always be 
distinguished from error, a reliable measure may not always be valid, but an unreliable 
measure will never be valid. That relationship can be put another way, in that "a valid test 
is always reliable, but a reliable test is not always valid" (Gay & Airasian, 2000, p. 170). 
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Referent Reliability 
This method of examining observer's reliability differs from typical rater 
reliability in that crew behavior is compared to a pre-determined standard of 
performance, called a "referent," rather than the evaluators group norm. This referent is 
sometimes referred to as the "gold standard" for judgements. 
Holt, Johnson, & Goldsmith (1997) describe the benefits of using an external 
referent: 
Using a referent to assess evaluator reliability has three important 
implications. First, high referent-rater reliability results in high rater-
reliability. If evaluators are judging crew behavior in accordance with the 
same set of standards, then they will necessarily agree with another. 
Second, the distribution of referent scores defines the appropriate 
distributional characteristics of evaluator scores. Hence, by training to 
match the referent judgements, evaluators can be trained to match the 
mean, variance, and skewness of the referent distribution. Third, a major 
advantage of referent reliability over inter-rater reliability is that the 
problem of an incorrect group norm for judgements is avoided. That is, in 
the case where the majority of raters are rating incorrectly, the other raters 
will not be trained to the incorrect standard, (p. 917) 
Observation Accuracy 
Under AQP, a check airman observes what the flight crew says and does during 
the LOFT or LOE scenario. Because these observations form the basis for the overall 
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crew performance rating, accuracy is critically important. All raters, therefore, must use 
the same parameters of "behavioral information" for scoring crews during each event set 
(Baker & Dismukes, 1997). 
While there is substantial reference material on rater agreement, there has been 
little research regarding observation accuracy in terms of pilot performance. One study 
(George Mason University, 1996) indicated that raters' average agreement for observed 
CRM behavior improved only marginally after calibration training, consisting of 
discussion of inconsistent observations. 
Factors that can reduce observational accuracy include the type and number of 
complex event sets in the scenario, and the fact that the evaluator also has to act as a 
simulator operator, scenario facilitator, and instructor. The workload associated with 
performance of these duties can reduce the degree to which accurate observations are 
made. While the evidence indicates that check airmen acting as evaluators are generally 
accurate when observing CRM behavior, effective training strategies have yet to be fully 
developed (Baker & Dismukes, 1997). 
Rater Agreement 
Flight crew performance during an observational PPA is usually documented by 
the assignment of a grade based on a pre-determined, defined scale. Inter-rater agreement 
is the extent to which various observers (of the same performance) agree concerning the 
assigned grade. Several recent studies have shown that raters can achieve reasonable 
levels of consistency (Brannick, Prince, Salas, & Prince, 1993). 
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Different rating scales and levels of ratings (overall scenario vs. "event set" 
ratings) can also affect rater agreement. One recent study concluded that the most reliable 
results of a PPA could be produced utilizing event set level observations and grading with 
a 5-point scale (Seamster, Edens & Holt, 1995). For a PPA, then: 
Check airmen can demonstrate acceptable levels of both inter-rater 
agreement and reliability when assessing specific scenario events. In 
general, check airmen can agree regarding the level of performance 
demonstrated by the crew with respect to a defined scale (i.e., crew 
performance was a 3 on a 4-point scale). [However] rater training may 
need to include more than discussion to ensure that check airmen are 
accurate and calibrated regarding the carrier's LOS [Line Operational 
Simulation] rating scales. (Baker & Dismukes, 1997, p. 454) 
Observer Training 
Typical rater calibration training in the airline industry consists of a one-day 
workshop in which the instructors receive required information about the program, 
discuss various aspects of the air carrier's rating process, and practice assessing and 
rating videotaped LOFTs. The evaluators observe a particular flight crew's taped 
performance on a given event set, and then individually rate the crew's performance. 
After class review, rating discrepancies are discussed among the group to reach 
consensus. A videotape of the same event, but performed by a different crew, is then 
rated to determine the group's level of calibration (Baker & Mulqueen, 1999). 
A George Mason University study (Williams, Holt, & Boehm-Davis, 1997) rated 
the three models of rater training currently used to reduce rater biases and increase 
reliability and accuracy. First, and best, was "familiarization with behaviorally-based 
scales prior to rating aids schema formation and accurate categorization of performance" 
(p. 515). Next, and also important, "frame of reference training (aligning idiosyncratic 
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standards of a group of raters with organizational standards by establishing a prior frame 
of reference) has been shown to reduce rater error and increase rater accuracy more 
effectively than other training approaches" (p. 515). Least effective was the traditional 
workshop training method. 
Effective pilot instructor/evaluator training (identified as industry "best 
practices") as described by the American Institutes for Research (Baker & Mulqueen, 
1999) should include: 
1. A detailed discussion of the LOE or LOFT scenario, both on the overall and 
event set levels. 
2. A detailed discussion of the technical and CRM skills to be assessed. 
3. A review of the performance standards for each area to be studied, whether 
technical or CRM knowledge, skills or abilities. 
4. Training to assist raters to be good observers. Discussion should focus on the 
nature of a good observation, and how to accurately observe a flight crew's 
performance. 
5. Opportunities to practice and receive feedback on the rating task. This practice 
should include rating videotaped performances of the specific LOE event sets, 
over a wide range of crew performance levels (i.e., excellent, good, poor, 
etc.). 
6. Feedback comparing the pilot rater scores with ratings established by 
"baseline", or true experts. This feedback is arguably the most import aspect of 
training, and should include: 
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(a) The congruency between each observer's distribution of grades 
and the group's distribution. 
(b) The degree to which each observer's mean performance rating 
differs from the group mean. 
(c) The degree to which observers are able to shift their 
evaluations upward and downward based on improving or 
decreasing performance. 
(d) The degree to which observers can accurately discriminate 
between crews of varying performance levels (Hamman, 
Beaubien, & Holt, 1999). 
Critical Incident Technique 
This technique outlines a general set of specifications for observational studies, 
most of which are appropriate to a PPA. Initially formulated in 1947, the requirements 
are grouped into three categories: observers, groups being observed, and the behaviors to 
be observed. 
1. Observers - Persons doing the observing must be knowledgeable regarding 
the activity, they must have some relation (personal, professional, etc.) to 
those being observed, and there must be specific training requirements in 
order to adequately do the observing. 
2. Groups to be observed - The study documentation must include a general 
description of the group, the location, times, and conditions of the planned 
observations. 
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3. Behaviors to be observed - Emphasis should be placed on the general type of 
activity, specific behaviors targeted for observation, and the criteria of the 
specific behavior that is of relevance and importance to the general aim of the 
study (Gawron, 2000). 
Performance Measurement Instrument 
Various performance measurement recording tools have been used over the years, 
with the Pilot Performance Description Report (PPDR) used by Prophet & Jolley (1969) 
one of the first. In this instrument, ratings are anchored to specific performance standards, 
allowing an observer to record desired elements of performance. It also contains a 
subjective rating scale that allows an evaluator to utilize his/her experience in assessing 
aviator performance. Numerous studies since that time, including performance 
investigations by Childs, Spears, and Prophet in 1983, and Kaempf and Blackwell in 
1990, have utilized similar tools (Kaempf & Klinger, 1993). All of these studies have 
demonstrated that proficiency ratings with descriptive scales are more reliable than 
ratings made without them. 
The Pilot Performance Index (PPI) was developed with the aid of subject matter 
experts (Stein, 1984, p. 20). Essentially, the PPI is a list of performance variables and 
associated performance criteria that specifically differentiates novice from experienced 
pilots. Many of the performance variables are directly applicable to the operation of 
modern transport category, including pitch angle on takeoff, airspeeds, headings, and 
bank angles. Other variables, such as "course deviation indicator, " "omni bearing 
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sensor," and "manifold pressure" are more appropriate for a very generalized pilot 
population flying less sophisticated aircraft. 
Table 2 
Pilot Performance Index Variable List 
Takeoff 
Pitch angle 
Climb 
Heading 
Airspeed 
Enroute 
Altitude 
Pitch angle 
Heading 
Course deviation 
indicator 
Omni bearing 
selector 
Descent 
Heading 
Airspeed 
Bank angle 
Course deviation 
indicator 
Omni bearing 
selector 
Approach 
Heading 
Manifold left 
Manifold right 
Bank angle 
Final Approach 
Heading 
Gear position 
Flap position 
Course 
deviation 
indicator 
Kaempf & Klinger's (1993) Performance Measurement Instrument (PMI) enables 
observers to document and assess aviator proficiency within the context of specific tasks 
and conditions. With this tool, pilots are graded in four major flight tasks, loosely 
grouped as Takeoff, Enroute, Category II (CAT II) Instrument Landing System (ILS) 
Approach, and Missed Approach, with 79 individual performance elements. In order to 
be sensitive to various levels of proficiency, but still provide a means for the observer to 
document unsatisfactory performance, a six point rating scale was developed, with the 
following verbal anchors: unsatisfactory, acceptable, below average, average, above 
average, and expert. 
Evaluations of the PMI indicate that trained observers can reliably recognize and 
record specific elements of pilot performance, and can apply the performance rating 
scales reliably as well. However, a lack of practice with the PMI, observation of both 
crewmembers, and difficulty determining the individual pilot contribution to the team 
performance can produce an undesirable lack of standardization between observers. 
Event Set 
An event set is a group of related flight events which are inserted into a LOFT or 
LOE scenario for specific training objectives. The set is usually made up of an event 
trigger (condition that activates the set), distracters (conditions inserted designed to divert 
the crew's attention), and supporting events (other events that serve to reinforce the 
training objectives) (Hamman, Seamster, & Edens, 1995). And while it is understood that 
the use of appropriate event sets provides the most effective rater training and 
observational reliability (Seamster, Edens, & Holt, 1995), the LOFT and LOE are 
training exercises only, and take place in a simulated environment. However, evaluations 
of line pilot performance could benefit from similar grouping of flight maneuvers into 
event sets, on both the grading forms and during observer training. 
Observational Worksheet 
As utilized in the AQP, the evaluator7s worksheet is a primary tool for assessing 
pilot performance. There are a number of features incorporated into the worksheet that 
serve to improve the overall rating reliability, including: 
1. Assessment areas based on event sets, usually subdivided into areas such as 
flight operations considerations, human performance, situational awareness, 
and specific maneuvers. "Ratings based on LOE event sets are less 
confounded by inflation or leniency errors leading to a more reliable 
performance assessment" (Seamster, Edens, & Holt, 1995, p. 613). 
Observation forms used in a recent study (Ikomi, Boehm-Davis, Holt, & 
Incalcaterra, 1999) were divided into four major areas: Experience and 
training questions, flight departure phase events, flight cruise phase events, 
and flight arrival phase events, thus targeting those specific areas of interest in 
the study. 
2. Similarity between the LOE and the air carrier's line check forms, and in the 
use of a common rating scale. Familiarity with a common form leads to fewer 
observer recording errors, and a standard scale used across the full range of air 
carrier evaluation environments allows the instructors/evaluators to develop 
pilot performance rating skills based on a consistent set of crew performance 
standards (Schultz, Seamster, & Edens, 1997). 
Knowledge, Skills and Abilities 
A common methodology used in personnel research has been the assignment of 
numerical grades to various categories of human performance. While many grading 
scales and formats have been used, the selection of appropriate behaviors to observe and 
grade is critical. It has been noted that it is important that rigorous behavior selections 
and behaviorally anchored procedures be used in the development of rating scales, 
regardless of the particular grading format to be used (Landy & Farr, 1980). 
Development of appropriate behaviorally- anchored rating scales (BARS) requires 
the use of just such rigorous procedures. These scales were first proposed in 1954 as an 
outgrowth of the critical incident technique previously discussed. A recent joint effort of 
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FlightSafety International and US Airways Express (Bramble, 1997) initially considered 
96 job behaviors and 12 broad performance categories as critical in future air carrier 
pilots. Further research, primarily interviews with pilots and airline management, 
identified 32 behaviors as "anchors" for nine fundamental behavior scales. Those 
included: (a) professionalism, (b) awareness, (c) responsibility/initiative, (d) flying skills, 
(e) communication, (f) judgement/decision making, (g) interactions with passengers, and 
(h) interactions with flight attendants. While the usefulness of this particular F/O BARS 
needs further validation, FlightSafety plans to use the scales as a criterion measure in a 
future pilot selection study. 
A later predictive study evaluated general ability, conscientiousness, and stability 
as predictors of regional airline pilot performance (Bramble, 1998). Job performance was 
assessed utilizing the nine fundamental BARS scales noted above, resulting in the 
generation of both "proficiency" and "interpersonal" factors. 
A recent study (Jentsch, Bowers, Martin, Barnett, & Prince, 1997) was conducted 
to identify training needs for those new F/Os about to begin their pilot-not-flying (PNF) 
duties. Interviews with F/Os, as well as a review of the NASA ASRS, indicated that there 
is a tendency for F/Os not to adequately monitor and challenge the Captain (one-half of 
total incidents recorded), while procedural errors accounted for only one-quarter of the 
errors. The three primary categories of operational errors were: (a) failure to monitor; (b) 
identification of a problem but choosing not to initiate action; and (c) identification of a 
problem, recognition of a need to initiate action, but not doing so due to apprehension. 
During the interview phase of the study, it was documented that a "good" F/O was one 
who was knowledgeable, demonstrated initiative, was interactive, willing to 
communicate, loved flying, had a sense of humor, and presented an overall clean personal 
appearance. 
The Effect of Age and Experience on Performance 
For the purposes of a PPA, it would be valuable to know the negative effects (if 
any) of aging, and the positive effects (again, if any) of flying experience, on both simple 
flight skills and more complex cognitive tasks. Because of the controversy surrounding 
the current age-60 retirement rule for U.S. airline pilots, much research has been focused 
on analyzing the effects of aging on the pilot population, and other studies have focused 
on experience. 
Very recent data has shown that there is a definite correlation between age and 
specific performance measures. In one study, 100 civilian pilot volunteers age 50 to 69 
performed aviation-related tasks in a Frasca flight simulator. Performance indices 
included staying on course, dialing frequencies, avoiding conflicting traffic, and flying an 
instrument approach. Nine composite scores were recorded in working memory, visual 
associative memory, motor coordination, tracking, numerical operations, visual scanning, 
spatial processing and attribute identification. It was found that pilot age "was 
significantly correlated with 7 of the 9 factors . . . [with] none of the age relations 
favoring older pilots" (Taylor, O'Hara, Mumenthaller, & Yesavage, 2000, p. 376). 
Specific time-sharing task performance measurements, such as maintaining 
aircraft stability while navigating, were studied in research conducted several years ago 
(Tsang, 1995). Of particular interest are those trials that focused on the detrimental 
effects of aging, and the fact that increased flight experience can mitigate to a limited 
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degree minor age-related degradation. Experience levels were the sole variable in studies 
conducted through the U.S. Air Force (Carretta, Perry, & Ree, 1995). They demonstrated 
that flight experience and situational awareness were directly related; the more 
experience a pilot had, the better the individual situational awareness was predicted to be. 
Pilot Error 
Another aspect of pilot performance related to age and experience is decision 
making under high workload. Accidents and incidents caused by operational or 
behavioral acts of pilots have traditionally been classified as "pilot error." Review of the 
National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB's) records shows that pilot error was a 
factor in 38% of all air carrier (CFR Part 121) accidents, 75% of all air taxi accidents 
(CFR Part 135), and 85% of general aviation (CFR Part 91) accidents for the period 
1978-1990 (NTSB, 1994). 
A comprehensive review of this data was conducted in 2000 (Li, Baker, 
Grabowski, Jurek, & Rebok, 2001). That analysis identified certain characteristics of the 
pilot-in-command and crash circumstances in those accidents attributed to pilot error. 
Importantly, "Age-related variation in the prevalence rates of pilot error was statistically 
insignificant for major airline crashes . . . [and] total flight time showed an effect on pilot 
error only in general aviation crashes" (p. 54). While age and experience play an 
important role at the extreme ends of the scales (very young or aged, novice or seasoned 
professional), specifically in the general aviation environment, they are generally not 
factors in air carrier operations. 
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Previous Air Carrier Pilot Performance Assessments 
The subject air carrier had conducted five flight safety audits between 1976 and 
1997. The methodology for each of the audits had been the same; paid volunteers were 
selected from company management pilots and t he line pilot ranks to observe cockpit 
operations during scheduled line flights. The willing participation and cooperation of the 
pilots' union had been critical to the success of each audit, and the union's safety 
representatives contributed substantially to the success of the observational teams. There 
was no planned method to gather parametric data during any of the five audits; thus no 
attempt had been made to train (calibrate) the observers, or to assure consistency of the 
reported findings. Very little, if any, comparative analysis was performed on the results 
generated from the various audits, or the resultant findings and recommendations. 
The aforementioned data gathering method has persisted as a problem in current 
safety audits of air carrier flight operations. In addition to addressing the need for 
parametric data, this researcher decided that the pilot performance areas of focus 
suggested by the earlier audits should include: 
1. Knowledge - Flight Operations Manual, logbook, minimum equipment list 
(MEL), dispatch procedures, weather review, company communications, 
cockpit discipline and sterile cockpit, and general operating procedures. 
2. Skills - Briefings, stabilized approach conformance, preflights, and checklist 
usage. 
3. Abilities - Personal appearance, morale, command ability, attitude, and 
complacency. 
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All previous audits had been crew-oriented, rather than individual-pilot-oriented, 
and all reports had been completely de-identified. No demographic data was available 
concerning crew experience, company longevity, age, total flight time, or type of aircraft. 
Despite the absence of previous audits' parametric data relevant to this study, the flight 
crews' familiarity with the auditing processes and the trust instilled by the previous 
"anonymous" audits tended to enhance the reliability of the data to be gathered during a 
PPA. 
CHAPTER HI 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
In early 2001, the safety department of a U.S. air carrier desired to determine the 
level of operational proficiency among its F/Os. There were a number of factors involved 
in the decision to obtain accurate pilot proficiency data: 
1. The airline had recently been involved in a merger, and the labor integration 
issues provided ample opportunity for pilot distraction and error. 
2. The airline had recently experienced a high turnover rate among its first 
officers. More than one-half of the 2,000 pilots hired in the previous 7 years 
had resigned to accept positions with other air carriers, significantly reducing 
the average experience levels of the remaining pilot workforce. 
3. Reports from line check airmen indicated a possible downward trend in first 
officer operational knowledge, proficiency, and attitude. 
4. The airline had only recently completed development of an Internal 
Evaluation Program (IEP). Exercising the processes and personnel within the 
IEP could provide beneficial feedback to the embryonic program. 
5. There was the potential to compare the data obtained via the airline's other 
safety programs (FOQA, AQP, and LOSA, with ASAP under development) 
with the F/O proposed PPA data for a broader understanding of particular 
operational safety issues. 
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6. Finally, there was a traditional aspect of safety that relates to "communication 
and visibility." Line pilots needed to know that the airline's safety 
professionals are interested and involved in the day-to-day operations, and 
that there was a reliable mechanism for timely exchange of information. Line 
qualified auditors interacting with flight crews over a period of at least several 
weeks would reinforce both of these safety program characteristics. 
The air carrier's executive management approved the development and execution of a 
pilot proficiency audit, to start on June 1, 2001, and continue for a period of 30 days. 
The Pilot Proficiency Audit (PPA) 
All air carriers have extensive experience with self-audits, whether in an 
individual sense (i.e., a check airman rating a particular pilot's abilities), or in an industry 
sense, where observers of varied backgrounds scrutinize many different aspects of an 
airline's operations (typically a LOSA). A non-traditional F/O PPA could record many of 
the same parameters, but measuring additional variables of the F/O population would 
allow the use of correlational techniques not previously considered. 
The independent variables of date of hire, age, total flight time, total airline time, 
and total time in current position were determined to be those that would provide the 
greatest insight for the study. These variables were available though the host airline's 
pilot qualification computer-based tracking system, and were considered independent and 
reliable. 
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Subjects 
All F/Os of the airline were subject to observation; in the observational flight 
selection process, no distinction was made regarding fleet (aircraft) type, or operation 
(domestic vs. international). Personal information was downloaded before the flight was 
started, but no record was kept of the pilot's name or company identification number. 
Evaluation Procedure 
The F/O PPA was conducted in a manner very similar to traditional airline 
observational studies, i.e. LOSA and LOE. Observers accompanied flight crews on 
regularly scheduled flights, participating in all phases of the trip, from preflight planning 
and crew briefings through the final cockpit "end-of-flight" checklist. Most flight crews 
were familiar with this format from operational safety audits conducted by the airline in 
previous years. All observations were recorded on an evaluation form, similar in layout 
and content to the line check airman report form. 
All of the air carrier's flights were subject to auditing. One, two, three and four 
day flight sequences were included, based on the individual observer's schedule. Both 
international and domestic operations were selected, as were flights on all four types of 
aircraft operated by the carrier. Although the observers started and finished their 
sequences at only one of the carrier's "hubs," F/Os from all of the airline's crew bases 
were included in the study. 
Observers developed their own schedules, and flights were selected as randomly 
as possible. However, two other factors were taken into consideration: 
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1. Both very long and very short flight segments (total flight time) were 
observed, but obtaining as large a sample size as possible weighted the 
selection towards shorter flights. 
2. If a F/O had already been audited by one observer, then that observer would 
attempt to not schedule a flight flown by that particular F/O again. 
The PPA was not voluntary; a F/O could not refuse the observer access to the 
cockpit jumpseat. However, all subjects were assured that the study was completely 
confidential, that no names would be associated with any reports, and that any 
information used within the airline's safety program would be further de-identified 
regarding date and flight number. 
Interviews were conducted with the subject F/Os while in cruise flight, when 
workload permitted. Typically they consisted of discussions regarding the airline's 
Operations Specifications, operational policies and procedures, aircraft systems, and 
performance calculations. The same questions were raised with each F/O. Conversely, the 
observers encouraged comments and suggestions from the flight crews, all of which were 
recorded and returned to the Safety Department. The essential elements of these remarks 
can be found in the Qualitative Data section of Chapter IV. 
For a typical correlational study, a sample size of 30 subjects is usually 
considered accurate (Gay & Airasian, 2000). Although the validity and reliability of the 
study were believed to be high, a larger sample size would improve the overall results. 
Working within the constrains of the pilot (observer) contract, it was estimated that each 
observer could record two flights on each of the 17 days worked, for a planned total of 68 
observations. 
Observers 
Two observers were selected from a pool of qualified check airmen. One was a 
current and qualified Captain; the other had recently retired his position as a line Captain. 
Cumulatively, they had amassed more than 74 years of line operations, and 
approximately 55,000 hours of flight time, in both narrow and wide body transport 
category aircraft. Both were qualified as line and simulator instructors, were very familiar 
with the line check airman grading form and procedures, and had completed extensive 
AQP initial and recurrent training within the previous 2 years. That training consisted of 
several video tape sessions, group grading, and group discussion to resolve differences, 
as described in recent industry reports (Baker & Mulqueen, 1999; Williams, Holt, & 
Boehm-Davis, 1997). 
Prior to initiating the audit, three training sessions were held with the two 
observers and safety department personnel. Discussions during those meetings centered 
on the purpose of the study, the methods and the forms to be used, development of 
techniques that would prove helpful, and verification of inter-rater reliability. Limiting 
the total number of observers to two assured a high level of agreement regarding 
performance ratings, particularly given the two individuals' extensive AQP training and 
experience. 
Several issues that could impact the success of accurate observations were 
discussed: 
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1. Previous studies have shown that the presence of another person in an air 
carrier cockpit during routine flight operations can be distracting to the point 
of disrupting a normal operation. It is known as "intrusiveness," and is 
especially true if there is the perception that a check ride is being conducted. It 
was extremely important that every effort was made to minimize any altered 
flight crew behavior due to the observer's presence. As a result, techniques 
were developed to put the subject F/Os at ease. 
2. The behavior of one person in a flight crew can influence the behavior of the 
other. Since the focus of the PPA was the F/O, the observers were very 
cognizant of the effect certain Captain personalities (domineering, reticent, 
etc.) might have on the performance of the F/O, and developed strategies to 
minimize the effect on the ratings. 
3. It was discussed and understood that personal biases of the observers, whether 
personal or professional, must not be allowed to affect the study. If necessary, 
an observer would excuse himself from a particular flight; however, all flights 
scheduled were completed during the PPA. 
The observers were instrumental in developing interview questions, and in 
defining the scope of F/O knowledge, skills, and abilities to be graded. These preliminary 
meetings were also critical in satisfying the three Critical Incident Technique 
specifications for observers, subjects to be observed, and behaviors to be observed. 
After two observational flights each, the observer's preliminary results were 
analyzed and discussed. In a meeting dedicated to the study's refinement, very minor 
changes (for clarity) were made to the rating form, and items relating to the types of 
knowledge-based material to discuss with F/Os were reviewed and modified slightly. As 
a small-scale field study, this early exercise allowed limited refinement of the process and 
verification of the procedures. The exercise also verified the consistency of rater 
agreement necessary for a F/O performance study. Finally, the short field study also 
allowed completion of the audit within the 30-day time frame and the budget. 
Instrument 
The "First Officer Evaluation Form" (as reproduced in the Appendix) is very 
similar to the "Line Evaluation" form used by the same air carrier, and familiar to all 
instructors, line check airmen and observers. There are eight sections: (a) trip planning; 
(b) pre-takeoff; (c) takeoff and departure; (d) climb, enroute, and descent; (e) approach 
and landing; (f) post landing; (g) general; and (h) command ability/CRM. Each of these 
sections had a number of specific areas to be graded. 
Of the total of 74 entries that were graded, 26 were considered "knowledge," 38 
were considered "skills," and 9 were "abilities." The 74th entry was for an "overall" 
score, which was used as a reference to record the observer's overall evaluation versus a 
graded, or averaged, score for the same flight. The division of entries into one of the three 
KSA areas was intuitive to this researcher; any item that required acquiring a specific 
knowledge of a subject, as taught by the air carrier, was considered "knowledge." An 
item that required demonstration of a particular learned physical skill, such as 
manipulation of flight controls, was considered "skills." Any personal attribute brought 
into the air carrier employment environment (not learned) was considered an "ability." 
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For those items where a combination of attributes were present (i.e. cockpit/cabin 
briefing, where the knowledge of what the briefing should contain is combined with the 
skill of delivery) the particular KSA aspect deemed most important to successfully 
completing the item was selected as primary. 
Many of the items on the First Officer Evaluation Form are the same as those on 
the line check form, and other items were added or deleted only after a thorough review 
of the issues and topics necessary to successfully complete the audit. To assure face 
validity, this task was completed by four SMEs: (a) the Corporate Vice President of 
Safety; (b) the Director of Flight Safety; and (c) the two check airmen (observers) of the 
subject airline. Since the observations were to be made in the "real-world" environment, 
predictive validity was assumed to be very high. A complete breakdown of each section 
can be found in Table 3, Chapter IV. The list was deemed to be comprehensive by the 
inclusion of a varied selection of items from each of the three areas to be studied: F/O 
knowledge, F/O skills, and F/O abilities. 
Seven specific items were later decided to be of little use to the PPA, due to a lack 
of observation during routine flight operations and resultant missing values. Those 
omitted were (a) international planning, (b) rejected takeoffs, (c) international navigation, 
(d) holding patterns, (e) monitored approach procedures, (f) non-precision approaches, 
and (g) autoflight approach procedures. These items exist on the rating form, were graded 
during a few of the observational flights, and can be found in the final database. 
However, they have not been included in any of the calculations upon which the final 
data analysis has been based. 
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Likert Scale 
Grading of F/O performance was designed to be quantitative, utilizing the five-
point Likert scale. What each observer was looking for, however, was standardization. A 
" 1 " indicated a performance well below standard; a "5" indicated a performance well 
above standard. A grade of "3" represented a "standard" F/O, that is, one that performed 
his/her duties as trained. If rated a 3, the F/O's knowledge base was that required by the 
air carrier (to a level expected from the training given). It was not expected that many 1 
or 5 grades would be recorded; results were in accordance with the expectations. 
The referent in this case was the absolute "standard" as expected by the air 
carrier. Grading to the referent is much more consistent than grading to an "average" 
performance level. The extensive line check experience of the observers enabled 
consistent grading to the standard on a continuous, interval scale, throughout the PPA. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
After 30 days of observational flights, the final quantitative data set totaled 64 
cases, each case consisting of 6 independent variables and 74 dependent variables. A data 
base was constructed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 10.1.0) 
on a personal computer. Five of the independent variables - years of service, age, total 
flight time, total airline flight time, and total time in current position - are SPSS scale 
variables. The sixth variable, aircraft type, is an SPSS nominal variable. All data analysis 
was completed with the SPSS. 
Due to the nature of the study, not all graded events occurred during each one of 
the observational flights, resulting in missing values in the final data set. This researcher 
decided that at least 15 observations were required for valid analysis; of the 74 entries, 7 
were discarded due to the inability of the observers to gather the required number of 
observations. The remaining 67 entries were separated into appropriate categories of 
knowledge, skills, and abilities (see Chapter III for a complete discussion). Table 3, 
below, subdivides each of the individual variables into the appropriate KSA category. 
The complete and final version of the grading form used by the observers can be found in 
the Appendix to this report. 
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Table 3 
Rating Form Graded Entries: Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities 
Knowledge Weather review Computer flight plan Dispatch procedures 
Weight & balance 
Weather radar 
FMS / enroute navigation 
Knowledge of minimums / 
ops spex 
Terminal speeds / altitudes 
Logbook, maintenance 
MEL 
Fuel management 
Descent planning 
Approach planning / 
briefing 
Approach nav setup 
Equipment knowledge 
Optimum cruise speeds 
/ altitudes 
Diversion / alternate 
Speed / altitude 
restrictions 
Landing charts 
Use of autoflight 
systems 
FOPM knowledge 
Procedures, policies Company 
communications 
Cockpit discipline 
Skills Cockpit / cabin briefing Walkaround Preflight (cockpit) 
Abilities 
ATIS, clearance 
Ramp congestion 
Takeoff performance 
Normal takeoff 
Minimum speeds, bank 
angles 
Climb & descent speed 
control 
Speed control / stabilized 
approach 
Threshold clearance height 
Use of spoilers, reverse, 
brakes 
Secure cockpit check 
Departure nav setup 
Engine out taxi 
Takeoff briefing 
Crosswind takeoff 
SID, departure 
procedures 
Autopilot use 
Slot / line up recognition 
Normal landing 
Taxi procedures (in) 
Smoothness, precision of 
flight 
Engine start, powerback 
Taxi procedures (out) 
Takeoff alert 
Noise abatement 
procedures 
Transition level / 
altitude 
Precision / manual 
approach 
Go around readiness 
Crosswind landing 
Engine out taxi 
Checklist usage 
Traffic lookout 
Attitude 
Personal appearance 
Safety awareness 
Situational awareness 
Professionalism 
Workload management 
Decision making Cockpit discipline / CRM 
sterile cockpit 
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Demographics 
The 64 cases represent 64 observational flights, but only 61 individual F/Os. Two 
F/Os were observed once by each observer, and one F/O was observed twice by the same 
observer. The mean KSA scores and total mean scores for the graded performance of the 
first two F/Os are shown in Table 4. Note the very close correlation of scores as recorded 
by the two observers during these four observational flights. Descriptive statistics of all 
of the independent variables for the complete study are shown in Table 5. The sample 
size of 64 provided sufficient statistical power for this study. 
Table 4 
Mean KSA Scores for Duplicated Observations of Two F/Os. 
F/O A 
F/OB 
Observer #1 
Observer #2 
Observer #1 
Observer #2 
Mean 
knowledge 
2.90 
2.91 
2.95 
3.00 
Mean skills 
3.00 
2.97 
2.94 
2.94 
Mean 
abilities 
2.75 
2.75 
2.63 
2.63 
Total mean 
2.93 
2.90 
2.89 
2.90 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Years of service 
Age (years) 
Total flight time 
(hours) 
Airline flight time 
(hours) 
Total flight time in 
current position 
N 
64 
64 
62 
64 
64 
Minimum 
.31 
28.00 
2424.00 
79.00 
38.00 
Maximum 
12.65 
59.00 
12023.00 
8061.00 
2943.00 
Mean 
4.15 
37.31 
6372.10 
2312.55 
1003.13 
SD 
3.50 
6.33 
2373.74 
1808.15 
574.94 
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It should be noted that of the five independent, numeric variables, only "Total 
time" approaches a normal distribution. This is to be expected, as it is the only variable 
that includes data brought from outside the immediate environment (flying time recorded 
prior to being hired by the airline). Plotting the data for the remaining four independent 
variables resulted in positively skewed distributions, for the following reasons: 
1. Airline pilot hiring tendencies are toward younger applicants (age), but 
occasionally older pilots are accepted for initial employment. 
2. F/Os usually, but not always, upgrade to Captain when the opportunity exists 
(years of service). 
3. Overall flight experience within the airline depends almost entirely upon years 
of service (total airline flight time). 
4. Length of service on a particular aircraft is dependent on the staffing 
requirements of the airline, the working conditions preferred by an individual 
pilot, and the phasing in and out of various fleet types by the operator (total 
time in current position). 
A survey of the entire F/O population of an air carrier would probably not yield "normal" 
distributions for the five independent variables. This study's sample, however, was 
representative of the subject air carriers F/Os. 
Rating Form Entries 
All 64 cases were assigned an "overall" score by each observer. To validate this 
score (the observer's general impression of the flight), all scores for each individual case 
were averaged, and then compared to the overall score. Additionally, all scores 
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considered "knowledge", those considered "skills", and those considered "abilities" were 
averaged as well. The results are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics, Overall Scores and Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Scores 
Observer's overall 
score 
Total mean score 
All knowledge items 
All skills items 
All abilities items 
N 
64 
64 
1243 
1654 
493 
Minimum 
2.00 
2.70 
1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
Maximum 
5.00 
3.24 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
Mean 
3.08 
2.96 
2.92 
2.98 
3.15 
SD 
.48 
.12 
.38 
.28 
.55 
The range of "observer's overall" scores is high (with a corresponding high 
standard deviation, or SD) and its mean (3.08) is somewhat higher than the "total mean" 
score (2.96). The inference is that the observer's overall impression of a flight was 
somewhat better than the sum of the scores on individual items would indicate. Plotting 
either the observer's overall score or total mean score against any of the independent 
variables produced a flat linear regression line for all cases, indicating no trend in overall 
scores over time-based independent variables. 
As can be seen by the small SD values, the mean scores for each category (KSA) 
are tightly grouped around the mean. "All abilities" has the largest range, due to the 
influence of individual personalities and the difficulty of implementing successful 
corporate standardization of attitude, professionalism, and personal appearance. "All 
skills" has the lowest range and SD, probably due to the emphasis on flying 
maneuvers/skills as taught by the airline and as practiced daily by line pilots. Figures 1 
and 2 plot the mean scores for all categories and the various distributions of each is 
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evident. Note also the linear regressions, which will be considered shortly; knowledge is 
basically flat, or declines slightly over time; skills basically rises slightly over time, and 
abilities declines noticeably over time. 
Each individual knowledge, skills, and abilities item was extracted from the 
overall case data and descriptive statistics generated. Table 7 displays the results for all of 
the knowledge items, sorted in ascending order of means for easier recognition of those 
areas found to be below standard. Tables 8 and 9 contain the same results for the skills 
and abilities items, respectively. 
For the safety professional, the areas of highest interest are those that encompass 
the broadest area of knowledge, have a high number of observations (N), and are located 
near the top or bottom of the table (corresponding to either a high or low relative mean 
score). Low scores can possibly indicate poor hiring practices, or inadequate or 
inappropriate training; high scores may serve as models for desirable training techniques 
in other areas. 
Items of specific interest in each category (KSA) were analyzed for possible 
relationships with the five numeric independent variables (years of service, age, total 
flight time, airline flight time, and flight time in current position). The particular items 
chosen were: 
1. Knowledge - procedures/policies, equipment knowledge, and cockpit 
discipline: These three items are ideally representative of the types of 
knowledge taught at the air carrier; they are located at the top, middle, and 
bottom of the descriptive statistics table. 
2. Skills - use of reverse thrust/brakes, crosswind landing, and normal landing: 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics, Knowledge Items 
Landing charts 
Procedures/policies 
Diversion/alternate 
Flight policy Manual 
Co. communications 
Weather review 
Equipment knowledge 
Optimum 
speeds/altitudes 
Ops spex, minimums 
Approach plan/brief 
Use of autoflight 
systems 
Dispatch procedures 
Fuel management 
Descent planning 
Speed/alt restrictions 
Terminal 
speeds/altitudes 
Approach nav setup 
Logbook, maintenance 
Weight & balance 
Weather radar 
FMS/enroute 
navigation 
Cockpit discipline 
Computer flight plan 
MEL 
N 
39 
63 
27 
62 
64 
62 
64 
47 
59 
48 
44 
63 
46 
46 
45 
45 
47 
64 
61 
46 
45 
64 
62 
34 
Minimum 
1.00 
2.00 
1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
2.00 
3.00 
3.00 
Maximum 
5.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
Mean 
2.51 
2.57 
2.63 
2.65 
2.88 
2.90 
2.92 
2.94 
2.95 
2.96 
2.98 
2.98 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.02 
3.02 
3.02 
3.02 
3.03 
3.03 
3.06 
SD 
.85 
.59 
.74 
.55 
.33 
.39 
.48 
.32 
.39 
.29 
.15 
.13 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.13 
.13 
.15 
.15 
.53 
.18 
.24 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics, Skills Items 
Cockpit/Cabin briefing 
Traffic lookout 
Takeoff briefing 
Checklist usage 
Transition level/alt 
Use of spoilers, rev, brakes 
Autopilot use 
Takeoff alert 
Takeoff performance 
Speed, sink, stab. app. 
Smoothness precision 
Departure nav setup 
Engine start, powerback 
Engine out taxi 
Taxi procedures 
Noise abatement proc. 
Min speeds, bank angles 
SIDs, depart proc. 
Climb & descent speeds 
Precision / manual app 
Threshold clearance height 
Taxi procedures 
Engine out taxi 
Secure cockpit 
ATIS, clearance, etc. 
Ramp congestion 
Slot / line up recognition 
Go-around readiness 
Preflight (cockpit) 
Normal takeoff 
Crosswind landing 
Walkaround 
Crosswind takeoff 
Normal landing 
N 
50 
64 
50 
64 
61 
43 
47 
61 
61 
45 
39 
50 
56 
45 
40 
46 
46 
46 
45 
46 
45 
39 
42 
64 
64 
58 
46 
46 
63 
46 
17 
59 
19 
45 
Minimum 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
2.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
2.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
Maximum 
4.00 
5.00 
5.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
Mean 
2.74 
2.75 
2.82 
2.84 
2.89 
2.93 
2.98 
2.98 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.02 
3.02 
3.02 
3.02 
3.03 
3.04 
3.06 
3.08 
3.11 
3.11 
SD 
.53 
.71 
.60 
.37 
.32 
.34 
.15 
.13 
.18 
.43 
.32 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.21 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.13 
.13 
.15 
.26 
.18 
.21 
.24 
.28 
.32 
.32 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics, Abilities Items 
Situational awareness 
Workload management 
CRM 
Decision making 
Safety awareness 
Personal appearance 
Attitude 
Professionalism 
N 
64 
64 
47 
64 
64 
63 
64 
63 
Minimum 
2.00 
3.00 
2.00 
3.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
Maximum 
4.00 
4.00 
5.00 
5.00 
4.00 
4.00 
5.00 
4.00 
Mean 
2.98 
3.03 
3.11 
3.11 
3.11 
3.16 
3.31 
3.35 
SD 
.28 
.18 
.60 
.36 
.65 
.57 
.77 
.65 
There are several other items located at the top of the skills ascending means 
table (e.g. briefings, traffic lookout) but the items selected are more typical of 
the types of physical flying skills of greater interest in this study. 
3. Abilities - CRM, attitude, professionalism: CRM was selected because of the 
emphasis placed on it during F/O initial and recurrent training, while attitude 
and professionalism both scored high, had high SDs and are typical of the 
abilities of interest to the PPA. 
Knowledge 
The "all knowledge items" mean score of 2.92 is markedly below standard. Each 
case mean knowledge score was plotted as a linear regression against the five 
independent numeric variables. (A linear curve estimation model was selected for 
simplicity). The results are similar in each case. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the 
mean knowledge trend lines start below standard and display either no improvement, or 
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decrease as a function of both years of service and total airline flight time. The start of the 
regression line (below standard) and its lack of rise over either years of service or total 
airline flight time indicates that the knowledge-based material was not taught adequately 
in initial training and has not been learned during subsequent time with the air carrier. 
The items chosen for additional scrutiny - policies/procedures, equipment 
knowledge, and cockpit discipline - are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, relative to years of 
service and flight time in current position. The regression lines for these items are typical 
of most knowledge items - starting at or slightly below standard, and either remaining 
flat or declining slightly over time. These particular items reinforce the trend lines 
discovered previously in the knowledge mean scores. 
Of the 24 knowledge items, 40% of the resultant regression lines start at a point 
below standard. All trend lines decrease over time, to varying degrees. Interestingly, 
however, a few variables demonstrate tendencies that do not follow this norm. The 
regression lines for both equipment knowledge and Flight Policy Manual knowledge rise 
slightly when plotted against age. These plots do not correlate with the rest of the data, 
and therefore may be insignificant. However, one possible explanation for this atypical 
performance may be the increasing maturity of the subjects (with age) and subsequent 
study habits/motivation to learn. 
Skills 
The "all skills items" mean score of 2.95 is slightly below standard. Each case 
mean skills score was compared to the five independent numeric variables considered 
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previously, and a linear regression generated. The results are virtually identical - the 
regression line starts slightly below standard and rises to standard or above in all cases. 
The implication for skills is that initial training is good, producing a product very close to 
the standard. As one would expect, gaining flying experience with the air carrier 
increases the skill level of the pilot, either in terms of years of service or in time in 
current position. 
The three areas of skills interests - use of reverse thrust/brakes, crosswind 
landing, and normal landing - are diagramed in Figures 5 and 6, plotted against years of 
service and total time in current position. They are typical of most of the skills graded 
events; the regression line in both charts follows the general pattern established by the 
mean skills scores, starting slightly below, or at standard, and rising over time. 
Abilities 
The "all abilities" mean score of 3.15 is well above standard. Each case mean 
abilities score was compared to the five independent numeric variables considered 
previously, and a linear regression performed. Four of the five (years in service, age, total 
time, and total airline flight time) are virtually identical, with regression lines that start 
well above standard and decrease over time. One (time in current position), however, is 
almost flat. 
The implications raised by the descending trend lines are serious; the personal 
attributes of pilots when hired (attitude, professionalism, personal appearance, etc.) are 
scored as very high, but decrease markedly over time, whether measured as years of 
service or total airline flight time. 
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Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the abilities areas of interest - CRM, attitude, and 
Professionalism - plotted against years of service and total airline flight time. Note that 
while all scores start above standard, all decrease over time to a point at or below 
standard, in a manner very similar to the abilities mean scores previously diagrammed. 
Probationary Pilot Scores 
Traditionally, air carriers use the first year of pilot employment as a probationary 
period. During that time, probationary pilot performance is continually monitored by 
management personnel, and a line operational checkride must be completed successfully 
prior to the pilot being offered permanent employment status. 
Two important pre-employment considerations to an air carrier are age (years of 
service remaining to the carrier) and total flight time (experience brought to the job). Of 
particular interest to this study, therefore, are probationary pilot's mean scores and total 
mean scores in relation to age and total flight time. A total of 11 probationary F/Os were 
observed during the PPA; the descriptive statistics are contained in Table 10. 
Comparing the total mean and KSA mean scores to those of the overall PPA study 
(Table 6) shows similar, though not identical mean scores. Interestingly, however, the 
SDs for all three KSA categories are much lower (.07 vs. .38, .14 vs. .28, and .26 vs. .55). 
The lower SDs could be the result of a smaller sample group, or it could be that the 
variations in pilot performance are much less after initial training than found in the total 
study group. 
Figures 9 and 10 chart the same mean values (KSAs) against the independent 
variables of age and total flight time. Linear regressions were not used in these cases; a 
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Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics, Probationary Pilots Mean Scores 
Mean knowledge 
Mean skills 
Mean abilities 
Total mean 
N 
11 
11 
11 
11 
Minimum 
2.83 
2.70 
2.88 
2.81 
Maximum 
3.05 
3.16 
3.57 
3.16 
Mean 
2.93 
2.91 
3.24 
2.98 
SD 
.07 
.14 
.26 
.11 
quadratic curve estimation model, while more complex, provides a better understanding 
of the overall trend. Assuming that mean performance scores aren't measurably affected 
during the first year of service with an air carrier, the data suggests that there may be 
performance patterns based substantially on qualities brought into the work environment. 
Specifically, all three categories (KSAs) trend upward with age (i.e., the older the new 
hire pilot is, the better he/she may be expected to perform during his/her first year). 
Additionally, all three categories (KSAs) tend to reach a peak in performance at about 
7,000 hours of flight time (perhaps indicating an "ideal" total flight time for new hire 
pilots). 
The sample size in this particular analysis (N = 11) is very small, and no attempt 
has been made to determine if there is a significant difference between the means at a 
given probability level (t test or ANOVA). Thus, the level of confidence in any specific 
implication or regression may not be high; however, in general, the trends may indicate 
an area of additional study that could reap significant benefits for air carriers in the 
future. 
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Fleet-wide Studies 
The analysis of one variable related specifically to the type of aircraft operated; 
"traffic lookout." It is well known that automation in the aircraft cockpit is intended to 
reduce pilot workload, thus providing more time for human-oriented tasks such as traffic 
watch. Industry experience, however, suggests that the additional machine monitoring 
duties imposed on the pilot may negate any perceived improvement in overall workload. 
There are basically four types of aircraft in the subject air carrier's fleet: 
1. Fleet type 1 - the original "round-dial," analog cockpits of the early 1970s 
(e.g., DC 9-30, B 727-200). 
2. Fleet type 2 - transition cockpits consisting of capable autopilots, Flight 
Management Systems (FMSs) and autothrottles (e.g., MD-80, B 737-300). 
3. Fleet type 3 - mostly-glass cockpits with a complete FMS, moving map 
displays, autothrottles, and performance enhancement computers (e.g., B 757-
200, B 767-200). 
4. Fleet type 4 - all glass cockpits with the most up-to-date navigation and 
aircraft control systems available (e.g., B 717, B 777). 
Figure 11 diagrams the results of the PPA regarding traffic lookout. As 
automation incrementally increases (Fleet 1 through Fleet 4) the mean score for traffic 
lookout improves as well, suggesting that automation does provide workload benefits that 
may not be intuitively apparent to the industry. 
Table 11 documents the comparison between all areas (KSA) and the various fleet 
types. Note the consistent rise in scores from the least automated to most automated 
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Figure 11. Traffic lookout mean scores/Fleet type 
aircraft in all categories. Figure 12 illustrates this same information graphically. The only 
variable that does not follow the trend is the high mean score for knowledge (Fleet 1) 
which is higher than Fleets 2 and 3, and higher than would be expected relative to the 
Table 11. Mean Knowledge, Skills and Abilities for Each Fleet Type. 
Fleet 1 
Fleet 2 
Fleet 3 
Fleet 4 
N 
3 
30 
24 
7 
Mean 
knowledge 
2.91 
2.90 
2.90 
2.93 
Mean skills 
2.80 
2.93 
2.98 
2.96 
Mean 
abilities 
2.96 
3.15 
3.15 
3.26 
Total mean 
2.88 
2.96 
2.97 
2.99 
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other variables. Interestingly, Fleets 2, 3, and 4 utilize computer-based instruction for 
many portions of initial training; Fleet 1 is the only aircraft type that employs personal 
instructors exclusively for all "knowledge" based training. 
The skills variable score for Fleet 1 appears slightly lower than would be 
expected. It is possible that since the most junior pilots were usually assigned to that 
aircraft, those F/Os had not yet had the opportunity to acquire or perfect their flying 
skills. It may also be that the automation available in Fleets 2, 3, and 4 masks the fact that 
the F/Os flying those aircraft did not need to demonstrate the "stick and rudder" skills 
necessary to operate the aircraft in Fleet 1. 
In the air carrier environment, the data generated by this PPA would be of major 
interest to managers and directors in the safety, training, and flight standards 
departments. Human resources professionals would want to be involved in the analysis of 
data that might improve pilot hiring techniques, and aircraft fleet managers would be 
eager to review specific aircraft/pilot performance information. 
Evaluation of the quantitative aspects of the data generated by this PPA will 
continue in Chapter V. Conclusions and recommendations will be presented, augmented 
by additional qualitative observations and discussion. 
Qualitative Data 
An important aspect of this PPA was the unrestricted flow of information between 
the F/O population and the air carrier's safety department. Additionally, the auditors 
recorded their personal observations of general safety issues during the course of the 
PPA. That qualitative data is summarized in this section - not so much for the purpose of 
scientific analysis, but to present a more comprehensive overview of the operating 
environment under which the PPA was conducted. 
Personal Observations of Flight Crews 
Once assured of the focus of the audit - anonymous data collection, not specific, 
individual compliance verification with FARs or air carrier policies and procedures -
T/Os were eager to express their opinions to the observers. Those included: 
1. Training - certain components of basic indoctrination, international 
procedures, and security courses were regarded as "boring" and "ineffective," 
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with several pilots calling it "fill the square" training. Others felt there was too 
much "training by bulletin," which also is generally perceived as ineffective. 
2. Communication - while unrestricted flow of information between 
management and crews is important, many F/Os felt that the methods used 
were too diverse. Suggestions were submitted to coordinate the various 
electronic (integral, crew-based computer system), paper, and web-based 
technologies, for easier dissemination to the crews. 
3. Operational - ground (vehicular) traffic on the ramp areas is a problem at the 
major airports, particularly those that are "hubs" for the carrier. Several 
suggestions were for additional "policing" of ramp traffic. Also, it was noted 
that flight attendants and gate personnel need reminders not to interrupt flight 
crews while completing checklists. 
Personal Observations of the Auditors 
There were many observations recorded on the evaluation forms, most of which 
were directly related to F/O performance. Those served only to clarify scoring. But in 
their final reports, the auditors also pointed out several other areas of concern, ones that 
were not easily categorized on the forms, or related more to the operation in general. 
They included: 
1. Altitude awareness - many F/Os do not fully understand minimum altitudes as 
presented on Jeppesen approach and enroute charts, and adherence to the air 
carrier's own altitude verification procedures are not always complied with. 
Most F/Os do not have a good working understanding of the new National 
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Route Plan (NRP) requirements and procedures. 
2. CRM - the observers noted a general lack of verbalization between crew 
members. 
3. Crew callouts - a general lack of knowledge regarding several specific 
callouts, for altitude awareness, altimeter use, and engine monitoring. 
4. Captain as "mentor" - interestingly, one auditor observed an F/O on two 
different occasions, flying with two different Captains. On the first flight, the 
Captain was a very "laid-back" individual, generally relaxed about procedural 
compliance. The F/O's performance was rated as below average. On the 
second trip, the F/O was teamed with a very professional, more demanding 
Captain. The F/O's performance (observed scores) increased dramatically. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
"The foundation of air safety is essentially the willingness to examine, recognize, 
report, and discuss conditions that require remedy" (Air Safety Investigator Quinn, 
Quantas Airlines, personal communication, 1999). Mr. Quinn's observation is a valid, 
and important one. The fundamental assumption in this premise, however, is that the data 
used as a basis for examination, recognition, reporting, and discussion, is available. It is 
the knowledge of "conditions that require remedy" that is the first, and primary, 
prerequisite for an effective air safety program. 
The PPA 
The research question initially asked was, "Within an air carrier7 s pilot 
population, are their KSAs directly related to the pilot's age, company longevity, total 
flight time, or time in current position?" The results for this PPA show that there is a 
definite relationship between these independent variables and F/O KSAs, and that the 
resultant safety implications for an air carrier can be significant. 
Knowledge 
The "all knowledge" items mean score was 2.92, and 40% of the knowledge item's 
charted linear regression lines originated at or below standard. These two findings 
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are indicative of a pilot population that has not been fully educated in those areas 
examined during the study, or have rapidly lost knowledge gained during training. 
Another factor could be that as a new F/O became more comfortable with his 
professional duties, complacency began to set in. Identifying this pattern and interceding 
to reverse it is a primary responsibility of the flight safety professional. 
The lowest knowledge scores were recorded in landing chart usage, policies and 
procedures, diversion procedures, flight manuals, and company communications. Other 
knowledge variables were found to be below standard as well. 
The regression plots of virtually all knowledge items over time (either years of 
service, time in current position, or total airline flight time) were flat or declined slightly, 
indicating that the F/O's knowledge of these basic items does not increase once the pilot 
has started line flying. The independent variable of total flight time was not in itself 
considered significant in this analysis, as the other "time-related" variables provided the 
necessary data. Age of F/Os had virtually no bearing on the results, other than when 
plotted against equipment knowledge and Flight Policy Manual knowledge. As stated 
previously, it is not clear why those two items do not correlate with all other knowledge 
data patterns. 
Perhaps the most disturbing finding, and the one with the greatest negative trend, 
was F/Os' lack of knowledge of certain operational policies and procedures. This is 
particularly applicable to those operations outside the normal, daily routine. In a few 
cases, this could be a function of the type of training received, i.e. "training by bulletin." 
The pilots themselves commented on their negative perceptions of certain aspects of the 
air carrier's training (see Qualitative Data, Chapter IV). 
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Skills 
The "all skills" items mean score was only slightly below standard. Several items, 
including cockpit/cabin briefings, traffic lookout, checklist usage, and use of spoilers, 
brakes, reverse thrust, and autopilot, were identified as below standard. However, the 
linear regression plots for most of the skills items indicated that pilot skills in general 
improve over time, whether measured against years of service, time in current position, or 
total airline flight time. 
The data indicated that the F/Os are acquiring the necessary skills while in 
training, and continue to develop them once flying on the line. Skills that rely on physical 
manipulation of aircraft controls, such as crosswind landing, crosswind takeoff, and 
normal landing improve at a greater rate than do observed interpersonal skills. 
Abilities 
The "all abilities" item mean score of 3.15 is well above standard. In particular, 
areas critical to the safety of flight, such as CRM, decision-making, and safety awareness 
scored well above standard. Personal appearance, attitude, and professionalism received 
the highest scores in the audit. One interesting finding was that situational awareness was 
the only abilities item to score below standard, which is significant because S A has been 
identified in many studies as being a factor in recent CFIT accidents. 
The regression line for each abilities item plotted against any of the time-related 
variables indicated a strong downward-performing trend. While the personal attributes of 
the F/Os hired are outstanding, negative influences of line flying markedly decreased 
virtually all scores. 
Probationary Pilot Scores 
The mean KSA scores of new-hire pilots (less than 1 year of service) was plotted 
against age and total flight time, and a quadratic regression performed. Results indicated 
that the peak age for all KSA mean scores as well as total mean was related to age, with 
(generally) older being better. Performing the same calculations with total flight time 
indicated that there is a definite peak time for first-year pilot performance in every 
category: approximately 7,000 hours of flight time. 
Traditionally, air carriers have attempted to hire the youngest pilots possible with 
the minimum experience necessary. Additional experience was welcomed, but not 
necessarily at the expense of age. The sample size of the probationary pilot study group 
in this study was small, so this researcher's confidence level in conclusions drawn from 
this data is limited. However, additional research may produce similar results. That is, 
that the guidelines used for pilot hiring may need to be reevaluated; emphasis on 
increased age and "ideal" experience levels may be of significant benefit to an air carrier. 
Fleet-wide Studies 
This study has generated some interesting observations. First, the level of 
automation utilized in an aircraft cockpit related directly to the amount of outside traffic 
watch practiced by the F/O (more automation allows for more outside scan). Future 
studies could focus on this particular issue, thus reinforcing the argument that 
automation, when properly understood and monitored, does provide a greater level of 
flight safety, in terms of the traffic separation environment. 
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Secondly, while the total mean scores were directly related to the aircraft type, 
with the lowest scores on the oldest, least-automated aircraft, the relative mean 
knowledge scores were the highest for the oldest aircraft. Data from future studies might 
clarify whether this phenomenon derives from two slightly different F/O populations 
(e.g., less experienced vs. older), or from differences in training, such as human vs. 
computer-based instruction methods. 
Finally, the fleet-wide data highlighted an unexpected disparity in flying skills. 
The older, less automated aircraft produced the lowest skills scores, while the most 
automated produced the highest scores. Perhaps F/Os flying the automated aircraft 
actually did demonstrate a higher skill level; or, because the aircraft was "flying itself as 
a result of more advanced technology, the observers might only have had the impression 
of higher skill levels. Conversely, the non-automated aircraft F/O, flying the aircraft 
manually, might have demonstrated what appeared to be a lower level of skill, but might 
actually be more capable in the traditional "flight skills" sense. Future research could be 
designed to clarify this issue. 
Air Safety Programs 
The second research question asked at the beginning of this study was: "Could an 
individual pilot's KSA data be integrated into the air carrier's overall data collection 
process to enhance flight safety?" The simple answer is, "Absolutely!" 
For flight operations, it is essential that the flight performance data gathered is 
both accurate and appropriate. Safety programs have traditionally focused their efforts in 
the following areas: 
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1. FOQA provides excellent data on the performance of an aircraft (and to a 
lesser extent the pilot) in the line environment. The information is most useful 
for a general overview of flight operations events and exceedances, or review 
of specific "incident" flights: Strengths - identification of aircraft and flight 
crew operational performance; weaknesses - negative performance 
monitoring only, no specific individual pilot knowledge or abilities rating. 
2. ASAP identifies operational safety issues by thoroughly documenting 
potential pilot violations, including deviations from clearances and established 
procedures: Strengths - volume of data allows identification and continual 
monitoring and trending of safety issues; weaknesses - negative performance 
monitoring only, limited individual pilot skills information, no pilot 
knowledge or abilities ratings. 
3. LOSA provides a crew-based perspective of line operations: Strengths -
thorough assessment of crew-based performance in the line environment; 
weaknesses - very limited individual pilot information observed or recorded. 
The LOSA is complementary to a PPA, but its primary purpose is exploration 
of human performance related to threat and error management, rather than 
pilot performance measurement. 
4. AQP provides both individual and crew-based information on pilot skills in a 
"rehearsed" environment: Strengths - accurate observations and ratings of 
pilot performance during specific simulator sessions and LOFT scenarios; 
weaknesses - provides no information regarding pilot knowledge, skills, or 
abilities operating in the actual line environment. 
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Specifically, quantitative line pilot performance data that is difficult to collect in 
traditional safety programs is the primary focus of a PPA. Table 1 in Chapter I of this 
report highlights those types of data that, for the most part, are generated exclusively by 
the application of a PPA - individual pilot knowledge, and individual pilot abilities. 
All aviation safety professionals would agree that having access to any of this 
information is important. The air carrier safety experience of this researcher is the basis 
for the belief that all of it is necessary to build a complete, comprehensive aviation safety 
program. Each component complements the next; each is necessary to the success of the 
overall safety process. 
Figure 13 is an illustration of how the overall process might function. The loop 
diagram can be entered at any point, depending on where the initial safety deficiency is 
identified. For example, FOQA data might indicate that final approaches flown in a 
particular aircraft type at a specific airport are tend to be "high energy," and not fully 
stabilized. ASAP reports would confirm the air carrier's line pilot's concerns with these 
specific approach events. Procedures and policies, if necessary, would be modified, and 
those changes issued to the flight crews. If possible, air traffic control (ATC) personnel 
could be included in the process for possible modification of traffic handling techniques. 
AQP could confirm that the new procedures are being trained properly, and a subsequent 
PPA would be designed to determine any problems associated with the operational 
implementation of the policies, thus verifying the augmented training. A LOSA could 
then confirm, from a system safety perspective, that the process has been effective. 
FOQA would then be used to monitor approaches at the airport, confirming that the 
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problem has been resolved. If operational problems persist, the process would begin 
again, and the loop would continue until consistently stable approaches were observed. 
Each individual program is an integral component of the loop process, identifying 
specific air carrier deficiencies, or monitoring or confirming specific operational issues. 
But it is also important to note that not every step of the loop is necessary for each safety 
deficiency being addressed. Frequently, specific issues can be resolved using just a few 
of the steps in the loop. The full complement of programs, however, assures that every 
aspect of the air carrier's operation is fully monitored. 
Equipment 
FOQA \ -J^ ASAP 
eS 
L^J* AIR SAFETY \ * / C 
PROGRAM 
LOSA AQP 
Figure 13. The system safety loop of air carrier safety programs 
Recommendations 
A thorough review of instructional techniques (computer-based vs. human, 
teaching aids, etc.) would be beneficial in determining suitability in the current air carrier 
training environment. Additional emphasis is needed in both initial and recurrent training 
on those subject areas (knowledge and skills) found by this study to be below standard. 
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It would be appropriate to review ASAP and FOQA databases to determine if 
below standard areas (within any KSA group) are the subjects of, or related to, other 
recent program findings at the subject air carrier. Analysis of those relationships (if any) 
could determine the most effective way to improve education (knowledge), training 
(skills), and personal performance (abilities). 
As noted in the qualitative data, a F/O's performance can be dramatically altered 
by the level of professionalism demonstrated by the Captain. F/Os usually will adopt the 
Captain's "culture," even if it is in psychological disagreement with the F/O's style. 
CRM experience confirms that junior F/Os will seek a certain comfort level by not 
outperforming their job-related superior (Captain). The importance of the role the Captain 
plays in developing and maintaining a professional culture among F/Os cannot be 
overstated. Air carriers must recognize this fact and implement programs to encourage 
Captains to assist in the continual professional growth of the new-hire pilot group. 
The use of proven programs, such as experienced peer mentoring and 
probationary interviews and testing requirements, should be encouraged. These programs 
can stimulate additional study and understanding of the knowledge-based requirements of 
the air carrier. The mentors could also provide support for continual development of 
personal abilities/attributes, e.g. professionalism, personal appearance, etc.) as well as 
providing a continual conduit of two-way information flow. 
Air carrier safety professionals must be alert to tendencies toward complacency 
within any pilot group, and devise methods to reverse those trends. ASAP and FOQA can 
be particularly useful in this regard. 
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Initial and recurrent training requirements should be reassessed, perhaps with an 
enhanced emphasis on knowledge based issues. The industry has been successful at 
training flight skills to proficiency, and those skills must continue to be monitored. 
However, with the increase in the use of flight automation, a fundamental shift in 
educational thought might be appropriate. 
A scientifically designed, professionally implemented PPA should be utilized by 
any air carrier on a regular basis. The audit should focus on pilots within a particular 
aircraft fleet type, crew position, experience level, or other specific group within the air 
carrier's pilot population. The data should be combined with information from other 
safety programs to determine appropriate corrective measures (if necessary) and to 
recommend follow-on studies within the overall program. Maintenance of absolute 
confidentiality is a must; accurate records should be retained for comparative analysis 
from study to study. 
A well-designed, appropriately conducted PPA can be a valuable addition to the 
air carrier's safety program toolbox. The PPA augments the overall data collection 
process, confirms findings, and supports the recommendations resulting from 
collaborative use of the other fundamental safety programs - LOSA, FOQA, ASAP and 
AQP. As the industry continually changes, particularly with the introduction of "next-
generation" concepts like the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS), evolution of 
aviation safety philosophy will be essential. The safety program loop and the PPA are 
integral to the safe, successful air transportation system of the future. 
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APPENDIX 
PILOT PROFICIENCY AUDIT FORM 
[Company Logo] 85 
[ C O M P A N Y N A M E ] C O R P O R A T E S A F E T Y 
Internal Evaluation Program, Study 01-01 
# 
A/C Type 
Age 
Total T 
DoH 
M/F 
Airline Time 
PF/PM 
Prob. Comp. 
TT in cur.pos 
Trip Planning 
International planning 
Weather review 
Computer flight plan 
Dispatch procedures 
Weight & Balance 
MEL 
Pre-Takeoff 
Cockpit/Cabin briefing 
Walkaround 
Preflight (cockpit) 
ATIS, clearance, etc. 
Departure nav setup 
Eng start, powerback 
Ramp congestion 
Engine out taxi 
Taxi procedures 
T/O performance 
T/O briefing 
T/O alert 
Takeoff and Departure 
Rejected T/O 
Normal T/O 
Crosswind T/O 
Noise abatement procedures 
Min man speeds, bank angles 
SID, departure procedures 
Climb, Enroute, Descent 
Transition level/alt 
Climb & descent speeds 
Autopilot use 
Optimum cruise speeds/alt 
Weather - Radar 
Fuel management 
Int'l navigation 
Diversion / alternate 
FMS / enroute navigation 
Descent planning 
Speed / altitude restrictions 
Holding 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Approach and Landing 
Knowledge of min, ops spex 
Approach planning / briefing 
Landing charts 
Terminal speeds / altitudes 
Approach nav setup 
Use of autoflight systems 
Monitored app procedures 
Non-precision app 
Precision / manual app 
Precision / autoflight app 
Speed / sink control, stab app 
Slot / line up recognition 
Go-around readiness 
Threshold clearance height 
Normal landing 
Crosswind landing 
Use of spoilers, reverse, brks 
Post Landing 
Taxi procedures 
Engine out taxi 
Secure cockpit 
Logbook, maint 
General 
Attitude 
Safety awareness 
Equipment knowledge 
Flight Ops policy knowledge 
Procedures / policies 
Professionalism 
Company communications 
Smoothness / precision of fit 
Checklist usage 
Traffic lookout 
Personal appearance 
Command Ability / CRM 
Situational awareness 
Workload management 
Decision Making 
Cockpit discipline sterile ckpt 
CRM 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
86 
Overall Evaluation: 
Rating Guide | 1: Unacceptable | 2: Below Standard | 3: Standard | 4: Above Standard | 5: Superior 
Comments 
